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The Jean Monnet Chair
The Jean Monnet Chair was created in 1988 by decision of the Academic 
Council of the European University Institute, with the financial support of 
the European Community. The aim of this initiative was to promote studies 
and discussion on the problems, internal and external, of European Union 
following the Single European Act, by associating renowned academics and 
personalities from the political and economic world to the teaching and 
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European Security Cooperation 
and the Atlantic Alliance*
H e l g a  Ha f t e n d o r n
I. The Changing European Security Context
At the beginning of the 1990’s, major elements of the post-World War II 
European security system are in a process of rapid transition. It started 
with a Soviet-American rapprochement, which led to a reactivation of the 
dormant arms control process. The December 1987 INF “Double-Zero” 
Agreement removed all ballistic missiles with a range of more than 500 
kilometres. With the Soviet leadership firmly anchored on detente, both 
the CSCE process and the search for a reduction of conventional forces in 
Europe received a new impetus. The CFE negotiations promise not only 
significantly lower force levels as their result, but also a predominantly 
defensive military structure in East and West. Military stability will be 
enhanced to the extent that both the risk of inadvertent military con­
frontation and the temptation to use military means for political ends are 
minimized.
Well into 1989, however, the Iron Curtain looked as solid as ever be­
fore in its post-war history, backed up by a struggle, though a mellowing 
one, of power and of ideology between two contending political systems. 
It started to fall in the summer of that year: first went the barbed wire at 
the Hungarian-Austrian frontier, then the divide became permeable to 
fugitives from communist oppression and economic mismanagement in 
East Germany, and on November 9 the Wall in Berlin crumbled. At the 
same time, Eastern Europe was experiencing a peaceful revolution, with 
the slogan “We are the people” its population claimed the civil rights it 
had been deprived of for forty years. Within a few weeks, the Eastern 
European countries (with the exception, at least until now, of Albania) 
were following Gorbachev’s line on Perestroika and on the road towards
* This monograph is an edited version of the author’s Jean Monnet Lectures at the European University 
Institute, Italy, held from October 17-26, 1989.
In a time of rapid political change, it should be noted that the author did neither wish to change the over­
all thrust of her argument nor add completely new material, though she has in the process of editing taken 



























































































democratization. It might be too early to tell where this road will even­
tually lead, but it is self-evident that major changes are underway that 
will significantly alter the political structure of Europe.
The basic results of World War II had been the division of Europe, and 
the political as well as military presence of both the Soviet Union and the 
United States on the continent. Today, both this division and the military 
presence of the superpowers in Europe seem to be open to question. The 
East-West conflict has been both deideologized and demilitarized. The 
dramatic changes we are witnessing in the East open up a prospect for 
both the disintegration of the once solid “Soviet Bloc”, and for close co­
operation between the countries of Eastern and Western Europe. The 
“German Question”, once laid firmly to rest by anchoring the two Ger­
man states to opposing military alliances, is back in the headlines.
Significant changes are also taking place in the West. The United States 
is reappraising its global role and burden, and is asking whether and how 
this burden can be either better shared with its allies, or devolved over 
time. This reappraisal of the Atlantic connection is to some extent due to 
a sense of overcommitment, of overextension of its resources; it is also a 
consequence of the increased self-assertiveness of the United States’ West 
European allies.
Within NATO, a major problem of the past 40 years has been the un­
equal distribution of power and influence between the United States and 
its allies, contrary to the professed equal status of all members. Over 
time, the differences in position have been somewhat leveled, but the 
dominance of the North American nuclear superpower, as well as the 
weakness of the nuclear have-nots, has remained.
With increased economic and political weight, and with more internal 
unity, Western Europe leads a more assertive policy and will also demand 
a greater voice in international affairs. The United States does support the 
process of West European integration.1 So far, however, it is not clear 
whether the implementation of the Single European Act, adopted in 1987, 
will also lead to a common European security policy.
If Gorbachev is moderately successful in reforming the political and 
economic system of the Soviet Union, and the arms control negotiations 
yield the expected results, we might be entering a period of increased 
military stability in Europe. At the same time, however, political stability 
might be reduced due to ethnic and social unrest in the former Soviet 
empire and the re-emergence of the German Question. Past policy in the 
West has been based on the assumption that military stability ran in paral­
lel with political stability2 -  interpreted as territorial stability and politi-
1 See Address by Secretary of State Baker before the Berlin Press Club, December 12,1989, US Policy- 
Information and Texts, No. 154, December 13, 1989, pp. 35-44.
2 This has been the basic assumption of the “Harmel Doctrine”, and German Ostpoiilik. See “The Future 
Tasks of the Alliance. Report of the Council. Annex to the Final Communique of the Ministerial Meet­





























































































cal status quo. This has changed. A major problem in the future will be 
how to manage change while maintaining political stability.
In the minds of many, the greatest uncertainty is the evolution of the 
German Question. With the recent events in the GDR, and a generally re­
sponsive West German leadership and public, the question of the future of 
the two German states, and their reunification is back on the international 
agenda. Any new European security structure will have to cope with the 
concerns raised by this prospect.
With it comes a changed perspective on the function of the Atlantic Al­
liance. To some extent, this is a consequence of the dramatic changes 
taking place in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, the amelioration of 
the East-West conflict and, as a result, a reduced perception of a military 
threat, and the re-emergence of the German Question.
The Atlantic Alliance, in the words of Lord Ismay, its first Secretary 
General, had a threefold political function: “To keep the Soviets out, the 
Americans in, and the Germans down.” The end of the Cold War has de­
prived it of its containment function; with a reorientation of US foreign 
policy toward a greater degree of unilateralism and less entanglement, its 
coupling function is under strain; while its control function is no longer 
accepted by a Federal Republic which has been an exemplary democratic 
state for 40 years and which expects to be treated on a par with the other 
members of the alliance.
NATO’s military function has been to deter an attack on any member 
of the alliance, and, if deterrence should fail, defend all alliance partners 
against any aggression, especially those on the Central (European) front. 
The strategy of flexible response served as an instrument for coupling the 
defense of Western Europe to that of the United States, as it also con­
trolled the risk that the United States would become involved in a nuclear 
conflict against its will. With the strategy of flexible response losing in 
credibility, and nuclear deterrence between the US and the Soviet Union 
increasingly being transformed into a security partnership, NATO loses 
its military function.
Instead, the non-military elements of security gain in importance:
-  economic security (inch jobs, resources, markets) and cooperation;
-  civil rights (especially the right of self-determination) and human rights
and their world-wide rule;
-  human environment, and how to combine economy and ecology.
Finally, the alliance was built on the assumption of political equality. In 
reality, however, due to its preponderant military power the United States 
has played a dominant role within the alliance and has controlled NATO 
policies. In cases of disagreement, the influence of the other alliance 
members was limited to a veto power, or the ultimate choice of leaving 
NATO integration altogether. Increasingly, the West European members 





























































































To take account of the various changes, to adapt the alliance system to 
the challenges of the future, and to give the European partners a greater 
role, three different conceptual approaches have been discussed:
1. An Atlantic approach: a West European pillar in NATO;
2. A West European approach: a West European defense community 
(WEU, EPC or other), reinforced after 1992 by a significantly strength­
ened European Community, with NATO reduced to a traditional military 
alliance without integrated military forces;
3. An all-European approach: a European system of collective security, a 
European order of peace, or a common European home.
Without completely rejecting any one approach, the West Europeans 
have in the past limited their initiatives to a number of pragmatic steps 
designed to strengthen their role within the Alliance, rather than testing 
any “grand design”:
-  The 1981 Genscher-Colombo initiative for a political union, and the 
1983 Stuttgart “Solemn Declaration on a European Union”;3 building on 
the fairly successful activities of European Political Cooperation (EPC); 
-T h e  Single European Act which came into force on July 1, 1987, 
where the twelve reconfirm their goal to complete the Common Market 
by the end of 1992, and to create a Political Union extending also to the 
political and economic aspects of security;4
-T h e  French proposal to reactivate the dormant WEU, leading to the 
1986 Rome Declaration in which the seven Foreign and Defense Ministers 
confirmed their intent to make better use of the WEU framework, and 
the European Security Platform of 1987 in which they developed a set of 
common policy principles;5
-T h e  institutionalization of the Independent European Program Group 
(IEPG), giving it a secretariat, and agreement on an ambitious work pro­
gram;6
3 See “Draft European Act submitted by the Governments of the Federal Republic of Germany and the 
Italian Republic,” November 4, 1981, Bulletin of the European Parliament, No. 50/81; and “Stuttgart 
Declaration on European Union,” June 19, 1983, EC Bulletin, No. 6/83.
4 See “Single European Act” (“Einheitliche Europaische Akte, unterzeichnet von den AuBenministem der 
EG-Mitgliedstaaten in Luxemburg im Februar 1986”) Europa-Archiv, Vol. 41, No. 6, pp. 163-183.
5 See “Rome Declaration”, October 27, 1986, in Alfred Cahen, The Western European Union and 
NATO. Building a European Defense Identity within the Context of Atlantic Solidarity. London et al: 
Brassey’s 1989 (Atlantic Commentaries No. 2), pp. 83-90; and “Platform on European Security Inter­
ests,” ibid., pp. 91-96.
6 The members of the IEPG are the European NATO partners, except Ireland and Luxembourg. It was 
created in the early 1980s to provide for a European forum to coordinate arms production and procurement 
which included France; it closely cooperates with the Conference of National Armament Directors 




























































































-  Continuation and intensification of the CSCE process and of East-West 
arms control negotiations, with good prospects for an speedy agreement 
on deep cuts as a result of the CFE talks.7
Until quite recently, the defense and security policy of most West Eu­
ropean countries (with the partial exception of France) has been based on 
a set of rather conservative assumptions:
-  military defense is an alliance matter; and NATO provides adequate ar­
rangements, though it will have to deal with new challenges and prob­
lems;
-  at present, there is no viable, separate Western European security op­
tion nor is a legitimate purpose for separate defense cooperation perceiv­
able. The WEU has at best a complementary and reserve function;
-  defense policy is complemented and increasingly transformed by a pro­
cess of East-West detente on various levels, with special emphasis on the 
CSCE and arms control negotiations;
- any intensification of West European security cooperation should nei­
ther endanger the cohesion of NATO nor the coupling of the United 
States to the defense of Western Europe;
- significant changes of the European security system will take time to 
mature; an All-European security system might be a long-term goal, but 
not an immediate perspective;
- the primary goal is the economic integration and political union of 
Western Europe, to be realized in the EC framework.
European thinking has thus focused less on alternative security struc­
tures than on adapting and complementing the existing European and At­
lantic organizations. In this context, a reinvigorated Western European 
Union could best serve as a European security caucus in NATO, fulfilling 
the following tasks:
-  providing reassurance in case of an attack by reliance on an automatic 
security guarantee;
-  serving for intra-European policy coordination in defense and security 
affairs, e.g. in burden-sharing, in arms control, or in responding to US 
initiatives;
-  providing for coordination of industrial and technological policies as 
well as for joint arms production, and paving the way for a two-way 
street in arms procurement across the Atlantic;
-  tying Great Britain to the defense of the European continent;
-  constituting a political framework for rapprochement between the two 
German states;
-  assisting in building a European political identity, encompassing secu­
rity and defense, and by providing for a greater degree of self-assurance.
7 The CSCE process started 1973 with the Helsinki Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, 
its result being the Helsinki Final Act of 1975, see Luigi Vittorio Ferraris, Report on a Negotiation: 
Helsinki -  Geneva -  Helsinki 1972-1975. Leiden: Sijthoff 1979; so far there have been review confer­
ences in Belgrade, Madrid and Vienna. The Vienna meeting gave a mandate to a conference on Conven­




























































































The West Europeans still face enormous problems if they wish to increase 
the scope and intensity of their security cooperation.
One problem is to avoid the duplication of policy coordination within 
the WEU on the one hand, and NATO and its EUROGROUP on the 
other. A separate European security cooperation framework would, in 
the words of a recent British observer, “offer a rich potential for dupli­
cation, redundancy, and institutional displacement.”8 *
There is also the fundamental dilemma that the French are very reluc­
tant to get involved in any type of joint defense planning that would bring 
them back into NATO while the British, on the other hand, resist any 
separate military coordination outside the alliance which might weaken 
the NATO link.
Further, there are the inherent institutional problems of the Western 
European Union:
The issue of a common seat for its branches has not yet been settled: 
should it be in Brussels, to allow for close coordination with the other 
European institutions and NATO, or in Paris, as the French would like to 
have it?
Another open issue is its membership. Though there is a consensus that 
the WEU should not become a club of the “big boys”, the question of en­
largement is charged with difficulties: how to get the Danes and the Nor­
wegians in, and how to keep the Turks out -  by insisting that member 
states have to renounce the use of force in settling territorial disputes?
So far, the selection of the members of the WEU Assembly is unsatis­
factory. Should they represent national Parliaments as is the case with the 
present mode, in which the members of the Parliamentary Assembly of 
the Council of Europe also sit in the WEU Assembly; or should they have 
a democratic legitimacy of their own, which they would gain if they 
would be delegated from the directly elected European Parliament? And 
what will be their relationship with their national governments?
Another question to be tackled will be the preservation of the essential 
security link with the United States -  the coupling of the defense of West­
ern Europe to that of the United States (the nuclear umbrella) -  and how 
to maintain a constructive political relationship with the US in view of in­
creasing pressure for “a fairer share of the burden”, for devolution, or 
even disengagement?
So far, all US Administrations have supported the idea of closer Euro­
pean integration, including defense cooperation. Some observers, how­
ever, have been concerned that increased defense responsibility on the 
part of the Europeans would ultimately mean a diminution of US influ­
8 William Wallace, “Relaunching the Western European Union: Variable Geometry, Institutional Dupli-
cation Or Policy Drift?” In Panos Tsakaloyannis, Ed., The Reactivation o f the Western European Union:





























































































ence, and also of US ability to protect its own interests.9 The West Euro­
peans will therefore have to take account of American sensibilities:
-  recognize US leadership in defining the structure of the East-West re­
lationship, and provide for adequate burden- and risk-sharing;
-  retain the NATO framework, especially the political, military, and 
economic ties between Europe and North America;
-av o id  the “European pillar” becoming a “Fortress Europe”, e.g. by 
closing the European markets to American products;
-  respect American interests in the future European order (e.g. by 
maintaining a symbolic troop presence, and encouraging Washington to 
play an active role in the CSCE process).10
Western interests will best be served by maintaining the Atlantic Al­
liance, but adapting it to the challenges of the time. Giving the Europeans 
a larger voice in this process, a “European Pillar” in NATO -  in the sense 
of a “European Caucus” -  could contribute to more effective policy co­
ordination among the West Europeans.
The development of a Western European Defense Community, reduc­
ing NATO to a classical military alliance, or the dissolution of military 
alliances altogether and the establishment of a European order of peace, 
will be long-term perspectives -  for the year 2000 -  but are not on the 
agenda of today.
II. NATO in a Period of Transition
In a changing international environment, NATO will change, too. But 
what is NATO?
NATO was founded in 1949 as a classical defense pact. In the following 
years (1950-1952) it developed into an integrated military alliance, with 
military forces permanently assigned to it. Not only have the United 
States and Britain committed themselves to deploy troops on the Euro­
pean continent as long as is necessary or appropriate,11 but NATO also 
relies on nuclear weapons under the command and control of the US 
President. The crucial importance of the United States for defense and
9 See Paul E. Gallis, “European Roles and Responsibilities,” in NATO at 40, CRS Review, April-May 
1989, pp. 18-20.
10 See “The Agenda of US-Soviet Relations,” Address by President Reagan at the US Military Academy 
at West Point, October 28, 1987, Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents Vol. 23, Nr. 43, 
November 2, 1987, p.1237; “Blueprint for a New Era in Europe,” Address by Secretary of State Baker be­
fore the Berlin Press Club, December 12, 1989, US Policy -  Information and Texts, No. 154, December 
13, 1989, pp. 35-44.
11 After the communist aggression in Korea, President Truman in September 1950 dispatched four addi­
tional divisions to Europe. This decision was approved by Congress in 1951 with S. Res. 99, and reaf­
firmed by the US Government at the London Conference in October 1954, together with a British pledge 
also to station troops on the European continent, see Phil Williams, The Senate and US Troops in Eu­




























































































deterrence is symbolized by the fact that SACEUR has always been an 
American.
The raison d’être of NATO has been to share the risks and responsibilities 
of common defense; reality, however, has seen the Europeans perched 
beneath the American nuclear umbrella.
NATO’s strategic and policy framework is based on three elements:
1. a joint assessment of the threat;
2. a military strategy of flexible response;
3. an overall policy of deterrence, defense, and detente as resolved in the 
Harmel Report of 1967, and reaffirmed by NATO as recently as May 30, 
1989.12 The Harmel Doctrine acknowledges that NATO is not only pre­
pared to deter a Warsaw pact attack and to defeat one should deterrence 
fail, but also to expand East/West cooperation in ways that will reduce the 
potential for war.
The Atlantic Alliance has two main functions. Its first function is to maintain ade­
quate military strength and political solidarity to deter aggression and other forms 
of pressure and to defend the territory of member countries if aggression should 
occur. Since its inception, the Alliance has successfully fulfilled this task...
In this climate the Alliance can carry out its second function, to pursue the search 
for progress towards a more stable relationship in which the underlying political is­
sues can be solved. Military security and a policy of detente are not contradictory 
but complementary.13
The military doctrine of flexible response, also agreed upon by the al­
liance in 1967, maintained that NATO was prepared to meet any level of 
aggression with comparable force, conventional or nuclear, and declared 
that NATO would increase the level of force, if necessary, to terminate 
the conflict.
Over time, there have been numerous changes in both dimension of al­
liance doctrine, and the compromise on which NATO’s consensus is based 
has been challenged time and again.
The most dramatic challenge was by Henry Kissinger, who in 1979, at 
a seminar commemorating the 30th anniversary of the alliance, shocked 
the NATO faithful with his exclamation: “Extended deterrence is dead!”14 *
Today’s reappraisal of the Atlantic Alliance is in large measure due to 
the changing international environment and the less imminent danger of 
military aggression. The policies of Mr Gorbachev and the budget 
squeeze in the United States, along with progress in the current arms
12 For the Harmel Report, see above, fn 2; the May 30, 1989, NATO Communique has been reprinted 
in Survival, Vol. 31, No. 4 (July/August 1989), pp. 376-377.
Harmel Report, op. cit. fn. 2, p. 289.
14 See Henry A. Kissinger, “The Future of NATO”, in NATO: The Next Thirty Years, ed. by Kenneth




























































































control negotiations, have done much to reduce the military function of 
NATO to a deterrent and reassurance role.
There are also many expressions of increased self-assertiveness on the 
part of the United States’ West European allies. A major problem of the 
past 40 years of alliance history has been the unequal distribution of 
power and influence within the alliance between the United States and the 
other states, contrary to the professed equal status of all members. Over 
time, the differences in position have somewhat leveled off, but the domi­
nance of the North American nuclear superpower, as well as the weakness 
of the nuclear have-nots, have remained.
Accordingly, there have been repeated efforts to change the structure 
of the alliance, to provide for a more equal distribution of power, and, 
above all, to give the European members a greater role and responsibil­
ity:
-  In 1958 the French President, Charles de Gaulle, proposed the estab­
lishment of a three-power directorate in which the United States would 
share its control of the alliance with Great Britain and France.'5
-  In 1962 and 1963 President John F. Kennedy, in addresses at Philadel­
phia and in Frankfurt (Paulskirche speech), called for a “Grand Design” 
of Atlantic partnership, a “two pillar” or “dumbbell” architecture for the 
alliance.16 *
-  In the 1960’s, the United States tried to give the non-nuclear members 
of the alliance a greater role in nuclear affairs. A first effort was the 
Multilateral Force (MLF), which turned into a diplomatic disaster be­
cause of the parallel move for an American-Soviet agreement on nonpro­
liferation. The second try, NATO’s Nuclear Planning Group, turned out 
rather successful, though so far it has not really been tested.
-  In 1966 de Gaulle announced France’s intention of withdrawing from 
the integrated military structure of the Alliance, and the consequent need 
to transfer Allied facilities out of France by April 1, 1967.
-  As a reaction to American calls for a better burden-sharing, British 
Defense Minister Healey proposed the formation of a European Caucus 
within NATO. The EUROGROUP had its first meeting in November 
1968. France does not participate in EUROGROUP activities.
-  In 1973, after the traumatic experiences of Vietnam and the mutual 
irritations by Ostpolitik and Detente, US National Security Adviser, 
Henry A. Kissinger, proposed an agreement on a new “Atlantic Charter”.
15 See Charles de Gaulle, Memoiren der Hoffnung. Die Wiedergeburt 1958-1962. Wien, München et al. 
1971, pp. 245-323.
16 For President Kennedy’s addresses see Public Papers o f the Presidents o f the United States (ciL Public
Papers), John F. Kennedy: 1962, Washington: GPO 1963, pp. 537-539; and ibid.: 1963, Washington:




























































































In a related speech, Kissinger stated that the US has global responsibili­
ties, which the Europeans have only regional interests.17 This patronizing 
attitude, as well as the Arabs under the threat of the oil embargo, chal­
lenged the Europeans to agree first on a “Declaration on European Iden­
tity” and, only a year later, on a watered-down “Declaration on Atlantic 
Relations” with the North Americans.18
-  Under the threat of US troop withdrawals, as called for by Senators 
Mansfield and Nunn (the latter with the intention not of weakening Euro­
pean forces, but to strengthening its conventional fighting power), and by 
heavy pressure from subsequent administrations for a fairer burden­
sharing, the Europeans got on their feet and arranged for the establish­
ment of European coordinating bodies (Eurogroup, Independent Euro­
pean Program Group) and for a number of European support programs 
(EDIP, LTDP, CDI).!9
The European quest for a greater role acquired a new urgency under 
the impact of the double crisis of the early 1980’s. On the one hand, the 
West was faced with an international crisis on the future of East-West 
relationships (i.e. how to react to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and 
how to prevent a similar Soviet move in Poland); on the other with an 
intra-alliance crisis of confidence (given the wide-spread disagreement on 
the Western reaction to these crises, and the violent domestic opposition 
to the NATO decision to deploy new INF in Western Europe). Additional 
irritations were provided by President Reagan’s SDI initiative, the out­
come of the Reykjavik summit, especially the understanding between 
President Reagan and Secretary General Gorbachev to abolish all land- 
based missiles, and the Soviet-American double-zero INF agreement of 
December 1987 to scrap all land-based missiles between the range of 500- 
5000 km. Disagreements on nuclear strategy (as evidenced in the “Dis­
criminate Deterrence” report and the 1989 Wintex exercises) further 
troubled American-European relations. The idea gained support that the 
Europeans would do better to look after their own security, and decrease 
their dependence on the United States.
17 For Kissinger’s “Year of Europe” proposal see his address at the annual AP dinner in New York on 
April 23, 1973, Department of State Bulletin, May 14, 1973, Vol. 68, pp. 593-598, see also his London 
Pilgrim’s speech, ibid., December 31, 1973, Vol. 69, pp. 777-782.
“Declaration on European Identity”, resolved by a Conference of Heads of State and of EC Govern­
ments at Copenhagen on December 14, 1973, Europa-Archiv, Vol. 29, No. 2, pp. 50-53; “Declaration on 
Atlantic Relations”, approved by the North Atlantic Council in Ottawa on June 19, 1974, and signed by 
Heads of NATO Governments in Brussels on June 26, 1974, in NATO Final Communiques 1949-1974, 
pp. 318-321. 19
19 With the European Defense Improvement Program (EDIP) in 1970, certain European nations agreed to 
provide for additional infrastructure programs; the Long-term Defense Program (LTDP) of 1978 was an 
action program consisting of a wide range of measures designed to help to adapt the NATO defense pos­
ture to the challenges of the 1980s; the 1985 Conventional Defense Improvement Initiative (CDI), on 




























































































Where are we now, and where do we go from here? What are some of 
the most pressing challenges NATO is facing and how should, and could, 
it adapt to cope with them? The consensus on how to deal with the Soviet 
Union has become shaky. Should the West help Gorbachev to restructure 
the Soviet system and economy, should it let him stew in his own soup, or 
should it bail him out? There is a strong current in the United States that 
sees the main task as “managing the decline of the Soviet Empire”, and at 
most to engage in a “damage limitation” exercise. Not many share the 
benign view of the present Chief of Staff, General Powell, that the Soviet 
Union is at present “a bear with a Smokey hat and a shovel in his hand 
putting out regional fires,” but rather that it is still a formidable bear in 
the European den, which needs to be checked by the American eagle. In 
Europe, especially in Germany, the opinion prevails that the West should 
help Gorbachev to succeed in reforming the Soviet Union, and at the 
same time provide for peaceful change in Eastern Europe.
The developments in Eastern Europe, in the GDR particularly, give 
rise to the concern that German reunification will take place quickly. In 
the past, all alliance members have reaffirmed the right of self-determi­
nation and have -  most on a verbal level, some, however, in treaty form20 
-  supported the wish of the German people for eventual reunification. 
With black-red-gold in the stress of Leipzig, however, and huge crowds 
calling for a common German state, with all West German parties clari­
fying their position on the German Question and Chancellor Kohl’s 10 
points gaining wide acceptance in the Federal Republic, its allies have be­
come uneasy and are calling for caution and restraint.21
There is also wide disagreement on the role of nuclear weapons in al­
liance strategy. While the United States is trying to increase the number 
of options available to avoid or delay escalation to the strategic nuclear 
level in case of military conflict, the Europeans would prefer to rely on 
automatic escalators to prevent any significant military actions over their 
territory, whether they be conventional or nuclear. There is wide-spread 
reluctance on the modernization of short-range nuclear weapons, most 
explicitly in West Germany, which resents its “singular” exposure to the 
risk from systems primarily deployed and targeted on German territory. 
The Germans, therefore, emphasize the coupling of the defense of West­
ern Europe with that of the United States. On the whole, however, nu­
clear weapons lose political importance as their military usefulness dimin­
ishes. There are some indications that we are approaching a post-nuclear 
era,22 without being quite ready for it.
20 The United States, Great Britain and France in the Paris and Bonn Treaties of 1954/55, see United 
States Treaties and Other International Agreements, Vol. 6, Part 4 and Part 5 (1955), Washington: GPO 
1956, Doc. Nos. 3426 and 3427.
21 A good example is Secretary Baker’s address in Berlin, see fn. 1.
22 See Edward N. Luttwak, “An emerging post-nuclear era?” The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 211, Win­




























































































There is further disagreement among the alliance partners on the shar­
ing of risks and burdens. When President Bush offered the Federal Re­
public political partnership in his Mayence speech while visiting Ger­
many, and called for “creative responsibility sharing”, he didn’t spell out 
what such a partnership might look like.23 It should be more than burden­
sharing and the old numbers game; but is the United States prepared to 
share leadership? And are its partners ready to shoulder larger political 
and military responsibilities?
The question of out-of-area commitments is also at issue. While the 
United States expects its partners to join in its efforts at world-wide crisis 
control, the allies have in the past been reluctant to involve themselves in 
contingencies outside the NATO area. They have never done so as an al­
liance, though members have joined forces with the US either individu­
ally (as in the Lebanon in 1984) or in a coordinated move as WEU part­
ners (as in the Gulf 1987). The Federal Republic is in a special situation 
since its Basic Law is interpreted as prohibiting any deployment of the 
Bundeswehr outside the NATO system.
With the sharply decreasing sense of a Soviet threat on the one hand, 
and limited financial and manpower resources available in most alliance 
countries on the other, domestic support for both defense and the alliance 
is decreasing. Is the alliance faced with a crisis of acceptability, or of le­
gitimacy? How can support for NATO be bolstered? The Harmel For­
mula in itself might not be enough, though it should be made clear that 
the alliance does not prevent detente, but rather facilitates it by providing 
for political stability. It could also be useful for setting up an arms con­
trol and verification regime.
How can the allies keep trade, economic concerns, and burden-sharing 
frictions from undermining the alliance? European-American relations 
have in the past been plagued by “chicken wars?, “soy bean crises”, “steel 
conflicts”, and Gas-pipeline embargoes. The EC’s Common Agricultural 
Policy has been a bone of contention as have the COCOM rules to restrict 
trade with the communist bloc. A fair amount of energy had to be spent 
to solve all these mini-crises and crises, and to prevent them from 
impinging on security relations. What should be done to ensure that after 
1992 the European Community produces net gains for NATO as a whole, 
instead of additional irritations?
There is a consensus among Western policy elites that NATO continues 
to be a vital element in the Atlantic security system. As has been men­
tioned, there is a need for stmctural reform to adapt it to the changing 
distribution of weight within the alliance. Could a “European Pillar” take 
account of this trend and reform the present structure? What should it 
look like? Will the Europeans be able to muster the necessary community 
of interests to speak with a single voice? How could a “European Pillar”
23 See Address of President George Bush in Mayence, US Policy Information and Texts, No. 70, June 




























































































function without weakening the cohesion of the alliance, and preventing a 
disengagement of the United States?
There have also been various American plans for the reorganization of 
NATO. In 1984 Secretary of State Henry Kissinger proposed giving the 
Europeans a greater role in alliance affairs, while also charging them 
with a heavier burden, e.g. by appointing a European as Saceur.24 More 
recently, however, former national security adviser, Zbigniew Brzezin- 
ski, and SAIS professor, David P. Calleo have called for a devolution of 
the American commitment, leaving it to the Europeans to sort out their 
role.25 This latter perspective has not yet been taken seriously by the Eu­
ropeans.
For them, a basis goal is to preserve the essential security link with the 
United States -  the coupling of the defense of Western Europe to that of 
the United States (the nuclear umbrella) -  as well as maintaining a con­
structive political relationship in spite of increasing US pressure for “a 
fairer sharing of the burden”, for devolution, or even disengagement.
III. Burden-sharing in NATO
After this year’s NATO Summit Meeting, Secretary of State James Baker 
called for “creative responsibility sharing” with the US’ allies26 what did 
he mean by it, was it just new clothes for the old issue of burden-sharing? 
He defined it as
really a broader concept than burden-sharing. It embraces issues such as how we 
define threats to our security, how we divide up responsibilities, and who we en­
gage in responsibility sharing. It applies to a broad range of issues on the interna­
tional agenda.27
Has there really been a change of concepts, or paradigms, in American 
political thinking? To answer this question it might be useful to look at 
past paradigms of burden-sharing:
24 See Henry A. Kissinger, “A Plan to Reshape NATO,” Atlantic Community Quarterly, 1984, No. 1.
25 Zbigniew Brzezinski, “Choosing where to put our forces,” Washington Times, June 2, 1987; David 
P. Calleo, Beyond American Hegemony. The Future o f the Western Alliance, New York: Basic Books 
1987.
26 “After the NATO Summit: Challenges for the West in a Changing World.” Address by Secretary 
Baker before the National Press Club, Washington, D.C., June 8, 1989, US State Department, Current 
Policy, No. 1181, p. 3.




























































































1949/1959: Priority of economic recovery
In the immediate post-war period, emphasis had been on the economic re­
covery of Europe. According to the then Secretary of State Dean Ache- 
son, the size of European forces should not interfere with their countries’ 
economic recovery. Occupied Germany paid occupation costs, but also 
received substantial economic aid from the United States, mostly under 
GARIOA and ERP programs.28
With the end of the occupation regime in 1955, Germany stopped pay­
ing occupation costs; a few payments, however, continued until 1958. 
There had been an understanding that the Federal Republic would spend 
the same amount on rearmament and the equipment of the Bundeswehr. 
(Allied Forces in Berlin are still funded from the German Federal Bud­
get, the level of expenditures being negotiated between the FRG and the 
US and then appropriated by the German Bundestag). The FRG, as well 
as most of the other European NATO countries, received US Military 
Assistance (MAP).
1960/61-1968/76: Offsetting the “Dollar drain”
Between 1960 and 1976, a series of off-set agreements were concluded 
between the Federal Republic of Germany and the United States, totaling 
about 10 billion US dollars, to compensate for US military expenditure in 
Western Europe (the “dollar drain”) through the purchase of military 
equipment in the U.S., and since 1968, also by the purchase of US trea­
sury bonds, and by a German commitment not to exchange dollars for 
gold, thus stabilizing the dollar on international currency markets (and 
financially supporting the U.S. during the Vietnam War). Later on the 
FRG agreed to supply services for US troops in Germany (repair of bar­
racks etc.). Some West European NATO countries filled in for the United 
States in giving increased military assistance ands training to the poorer 
NATO countries like Greece, Portugal and Turkey, as well as to some 
other US allies like Iran, Pakistan and Ethiopia.
1969-1974: How to deal with “Overcommitment”?
In Guam in 1969 President Richard Nixon called on the allies to tale bet­
ter care of their own security, while the US would in the future limit its 
support to military aid but refrain from direct military involvement. This 
“Nixon Doctrine” was complemented by the resolve of Congress to end 
American overcommitment. Senator Mike Mansfield and some of his 
colleagues called in a number of resolutions for unilateral troop with­
28 Government and Relief in Occupied Areas (GARIOA) was fund to support the administration and to 
provide for economic aid in the former enemy territories; the European Recovery Program (ERP) was the 





























































































drawals from Western Europe (and other places), and for circumscrip­
tion of the war-making powers of the US President. Though none of these 
resolutions came into force, they were a powerful political signal. They 
were further diffused by the promise of mutual troop reductions as a re­
sult of the MBFR talks.
There had also been economic overstretch, which became evident in the 
various currency crises of 1968-1974. In response, the US closed the gold 
window” in 1970; speculation on the international currency markets 
forced it to agree to a realignment of the Dollar (to some extent forced 
upon the United States by Germany and France after these countries let 
their currencies float against the dollar. The Smithsonian Agreement of 
1971 provided only temporary relief, as did the “Snake-in-the-tunnel”, an 
agreement to limit the floating range of the combined European curren­
cies against the dollar. After more speculation, the international financial 
markets returned to a free-floating monetary system on the eve of the 
OPEC-induced oil crisis.
1976-1986: “Atlanticist paradigm” -  Improvement of conven­
tional forces
In the late 1970s and early 1980s a number of members of the US Senate, 
most notably Senators Henry “Scoop” Jackson and Sam Nunn, undertook 
various initiatives to improve NATO conventional forces, especially its 
C3I capabilities, survivability, sustainability, firepower, and ability to use 
E.T.’s, etc.
-  The 1974 Jackson-Nunn amendment was to improve the “teeth-to-tail” 
ratio of US forces.29
-  The 1975 Nunn-Culver amendment urged the Secretary of Defense to 
improve NATO standardization, and required US procurements to be 
consistent with the standardization of NATO forces.30
-  In 1977 the NATO Heads of State and of Government pledged to in­
crease their defense spending by 3% (in real terms) annually (“Three- 
Percent-Solution”).31 *
29 See P. L. 93-155, Defense Authorization Act, 1974, cited in US Military Commitments to Europe. 
Report of the Ad Hoc Subcommittee to the H. R. Committee on Armed Services, 93rd Congress, 2nd 
Session, Washington, April 4, 1974. See also Policy, Troops, and the NATO Alliance. Report by Sena­
tor Nunn to the Senate Committee on Armed Services, 93rd Congress, 2nd Session, Washington, April 
2, 1974.
30 See P. L. 94-106, Section 814.
3  ̂ In May 1978, the NATO Ministers pledged their countries to increase their defense expenditures in
real terms by 3% above inflation annually. See also The Three Per Cent Solution and the Future o f





























































































-  One year later, in 1978, NATO agreed on a Long-term Defense Pro­
gram (LTDP), with emphasis on conventional force improvements.32
-  In 1980, the Levin Amement required the Secretary of Defense to 
report on allied defense efforts, especially whether the allies were meet­
ing the 3 percent spending objective, and to describe cost sharing ar­
rangements within NATO and with Japan. Starting in March 1981, the 
Administration annually transmits to Congress an “Allied Commitments 
Report.” Congress also expressed its feeling that the President should seek 
increased support from host nations for the costs of stationing US forces 
there.33
-  Following up on the congressional mandate, the US Government, in the 
December 1980 Stoessel Demarche, demanded additional services and 
contributions from the Federal Republic of Germany. Bonn declined 
agreement on a Master Restationing Plan (MRP), but the Federal Repub­
lic and the United States concluded a War-time Host Nation Support 
Agreement (WHNS) in 1982 under which Bonn agreed to assign ready 
reserves to provide support and logistics for American reinforcements in 
case of an emergency.34
-  In a display of continued displeasure over European attitudes toward 
the Soviet Union, and about their lagging defense commitments, the 
Alaska Senator Stevens in 1982 sought a cut of approximately 20,000 in 
the number of troops deployed in Western Europe, and wanted to put a 
cap on the remaining forces. In a compromise worked out between Sena­
tors Stevens and Nunn, a ceiling of 315,000 was established, together with 
the provision that the President could waive the ceiling for national se­
curity reasons.35 *
-  The 1984 Nunn/Roth resolution, modified by the Cohen compromise, 
established a permanent ceiling on US forces in Western Europe at 
326,414 men; to be reduced by 30,000 in each of the following three 
years if the allies did not meet the 3% spending increase or specified out­
put goals (munitions supply, shelters for aircraft, sustainability of 
troops).
This line of argument was in accordance with the strategy of flexible 
response, and was to reinforce previous arguments for less reliance on
32 Sec fn. 19.
33 See P. L. 96-342, Section 1006.
34 For details see my “Die Zukunft der amerikanischen militarischen Prasenz in Europe,” Europa-Archiv, 
Vol. 38, No. 20, pp. 639-648; also my “Lastenteilung im Atlantischen Bundnis. Die Zukunft der 
amerikanischen militarischen Prasenz in Europa,” Europa-Archiv, Vol. 40, No. 16, pp. 497-506.
35 For the Stevens Amendment see Senate Resolution S 2951, 97th Congress, 2nd Session, September




























































































nuclear weapons as well as for less exposure of the United States to the 
nuclear dangers inherent in extended deterrence.36
— The 1985 Nunn/Roth/Wamer amendment was devoid of any coercive 
clause. It targeted US funds for cooperative weapons research and devel­
opment, to improve interoperability, and to work toward a American- 
European two-way street in weapons procurement.37
— The 1987 Conrad amendment to the Foreign Relations Authorization 
Act called on the allies to negotiate a schedule for increases in their de­
fense spending.38
-  The 1989 Nunn-Wamer amendment mandated cuts in US defense ex­
penditures earmarked for NATO if there was a negative change in the 
“baseline ratio” between US and Allied troops in Europe.39
1988-1990: “Fundamentalist paradigm” -  A Call for a devolu­
tion of the US commitment to Europe
With the withering away of the Soviet threat, the risks inherent in the 
United States’ military presence in Western Europe were reduced; but so 
also was the rationale for having these forces there. The diminishing 
threat thus gave rise to a competing paradigm.
The “fundamentalist paradigm” was not entirely new, and it came in 
two variations:
-  One was a call for world-wide power projection by the United States -  
and for a devolution of the traditional US commitment to Europe. Its 
proponents argued that it was not in the US interest to have 60% of its 
military expenditures tied up in the NATO area. Former Secretary of the 
Navy, John Lehmann, planned a 600-ship navy, while former National 
Security Adviser, Zbigniew Brzezinski, argued for a small intervention 
capability, to be deployed in international crises, be they in South West 
Asia or Central America.40
36 See P. L. 98-525,1985 Omnibus Defense Authorization Act; for the Nunn/Roth amendment see 
Amendment 3266, “Improvements to NATO conventional capability,” for the Cohen compromise see 
Amendment 3267, Congressional Record, Senate, June 20,1984, pp. S. 7721 and 7741.
37 See Amendment 187,“To improve cooperation in research, development, and production of military 
equipment among NATO nations,” Congressional Record, Senate, May 22, 1985, pp. S 6756-6766. See 
also P. L. 99-661, 1987 Defense Authorization Act.
38 p, L. 100-204, Section 1254, 1988/1989 Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Section 812, “Sense 
of Congress Relating to Support of Mutual Defense Alliances.” The Secretaries of State and of Defense 
submitted the requested report “Sharing the Roles, Risks and Responsibilities for the Common Defense” 
in December 1988.
39 See Amendment 527, “To provide for a reduction in the relative amount of the cost of maintaining 
United States forces in Europe that is to be borne by the United States,” Congressional Record, Senate, 
July 31, 1989, pp. S 9156 and 9307.




























































































-  The other strand has been represented by House Member Pat 
Schroeder, who in the Mansfield tradition called for burden-shedding, not 
burden-sharing. A “Defense Burden-sharing Panel”, chaired by the Con­
gresswoman, has judged in an interim report, that US commitments have 
extended beyond its capabilities. In the Panel’s view,.
US economic strength vis-à-vis the rest of the world has declined significantly. In 
1988, concerns about the Federal deficit, the trade imbalance, high Federal spending 
generally and high defense spending specifically have ignited a national debate about 
our future defense needs and a reassessment of US global military commitments.41
As a consequence, according to the report,
Many Americans feels that we are competing 100 percent militarily with the Soviets 
and 100 percent economically with our defense allies. Some have said that the 
United States has incurred all the burdens of empire and few, if any, of the bene­
fits.42
In the view of the panel, the United States cannot sustain this relationship 
any longer. It warns that change is essential:
The Panel states in the strongest possible terms that Europeans had better be pre­
pared to defend their own territory without a large-scale US ground commitment, 
because that commitment cannot be guaranteed for-ever.43
Pat Schroeder is generally considered a representative of the more liberal 
wing of the Democratic Party. Much of the report reflects the critique of 
those in the Democratic Party who have traditionally argued that US fed­
eral spending should be reoriented toward domestic social programs. But 
the report also draws heavily on testimony provided by political conser­
vatives, including former Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick and former As­
sistant Secretary of Defense Richard Perle. They argued that the United 
States needs to reduce its efforts in NATO because US forces will in the 
future need more flexibility in order to deal with projected military 
challenges to Western interests in the Third World.44
At present the two last paradigms, the “Atlantic” and the “fundamental­
ist”, compete with each other in American Congressional and public 
opinion.
In the past, the Europeans have tried to meet American expectations by 
a number of multilateral and bilateral programs. Most were ad hoc pro­
41 Report o f the Defense Burden-Sharing Panel. US Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on 
Armed Services, Washington, August 1988, p. 2.
42 Ibid., pp.2-3
43 Ibid., p. 8
44 See Stanley R. Sloan, “The United States and NATO: Commitment in Balance. A Case Study of US 




























































































grams, few ran on a continuing basis. One of the latter has been the 
NATO Infrastructure Program, in which most members pay a certain 
amount into a common fund according to their economic ability. The 
biggest contributors are the United States with 27% and the Federal Re­
public with 26.44%. However, the FRG is also one of the countries get­
ting most out of the program. From this fund the logistics structure of 
NATO -  air strips, oil pipelines, communications systems, airplane shel­
ters and other projects for the common use -  are financed. Also, the relo­
cation of NATO Headquarters from Fontainebleau to Brussels was paid 
out of infrastructure fund, as was the rebasing of the US F-16 squadron 
from Terrejon to Comiso in Italy. Other principal joint funding pro­
grams include the NATO Maintenance and Supply Organization 
(NAMSO), the Airborne Early Warning System (AWACS), the NATO 
Multi-role Combat Aircraft Development, Production and In-Service 
Support Management Agency (NAMMA), the Central European Pipeline 
System (CEPS) and the NATO European Fighter Management Organiza­
tion (NEFMO).
Ad hoc programs have been: The Long-term Defense Program 
(LTDP), the Conventional Defense Initiative (CDI), the Conventional 
Armaments Planning System (CAPS), joint R&D programs for weapons 
procurement according to the Nunn Initiative, and others, such as mili­
tary assistance programs to Greece and Turkey.
Bilateral German-American programs have been the POMCUS (Pre­
positioned Overseas Material Configured in Unit Sets), the WHNS (War­
time Host Nation Support) and the Roland-Patriot Program. Pre-position­
ing was initiated with the 1967 trilateral agreement to withdraw some of 
the ready forces from West Germany, but keep them earmarked for 
NATO missions and bring them back for regular exercises 
(REFORGER). In the 1982 WHNS agreement the Federal Republic has 
agreed to provide 93,000 reserves to support US forces redeployed to 
Germany in a crisis situation; with the 1984 Roland-Patriot deal the FRG 
provides the personnel to man US Anti-aircraft batteries equipped with 
Patriot missiles on loan from the United States.
German-French defense cooperation figures prominently in intra-Eu­
ropean Cooperation. Both countries regularly consult each other, and 
have anchored these processes in a number of joint institutions such as a 
Franco-German Defense Council and a joint army brigade deployed in 
South-West Germany. There is also a good deal of bilateral German-Bri- 
tish and British-French defense cooperation.45 *
Various European countries have formed multinational consortia for 
joint arms production. The German-French Alpha Jet and Roland Missile,
45 See Karl Kaiser/Pierre Lellouche, Eds., Le couple franco-allemand el la défense de l’Europe. Paris:
Masson 1986; Karl Kaiscr/John Roper, Eds., British-German Defense Cooperation. Partners within the
Alliance. London; Jane’s Publishing Co. 1987; Yves Boyer/Pierre Lellouche/John Roper, Eds., Pour une





























































































as well as the British-German-Italian Tornado, have been technical 
though not commercial successes. National specifications have added to 
the production costs, while different export policies have contributed to 
political frictions. As a by-product of the Nunn initiative to stimulate 
American-European joint arms projects, the number of new European 
joint ventures has decreased.46
So far there has been little intra-European burden-sharing, though 
some took place when Germany supplied military equipment and gave 
military assistance to Turkey, to which the U. S. had committed substan­
tial defense assistance in exchange for Turkish membership of NATO.
The most recent debate on burden-sharing between the United States 
and its NATO allies has to be seen in the context of another debate on US 
hegemony, and on US leadership during, and became particularly impor­
tant after, the Vietnam War as a debate on US “overcommitment”. Ac­
cording to the “Nixon Doctrine”47 it was to be solved, in some part at 
least, by off-set arrangements and burden-sharing with America’s allies 
and friends. It was conceptually fuelled by books such as Robert Keo- 
hane’s “After Hegemony” and Paul Kennedy’s “The Rise and Fall of the 
Great Powers”.48 There has been as long tradition in American thinking 
on how to make interests and commitments meet power and resources.49
There has always been some ambivalence in American Political think­
ing on the role of power. Deputy Secretary of State, Lawrence Eagle- 
berger, in a recent lecture at Georgetown University, reaffirmed that
the shift in the balance of power among the leading Western countries does not 
mean that the United States must abandon its leadership role. On the contrary, the 
United States will remain for long into the next century the only power able -  or at 
least willing -  to think in global terms and to fashion policies in the overall political, 
economic and security interests of the West. We have not always done this well, 
nor have we necessarily done so for selfless reasons, but the fact remains that none 
of our Western partners has the global reach or the disposition to take the lead in 
safeguarding the institutional mechanisms which are vital to the preservation of in­
ternational political and economic stability. Our capacity to play this role may have 
been diminished, but the need for us to do so has not.50
46 See David Buchan, ‘The West European defense industry: A vision, of an entente militaire,”, Finan­
cial Times, May 18, 1987.
47 See President Richard M. Nixon’s remarks with newsmen, in Guam, Public Papers, Richard M. 
Nixon: 1969, Washington: GPO 1970, pp. 544-556.
48 Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy. 
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press 1984; Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall o f the Great Powers: 
Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000. New York: Random House 1987.
49 For a classical treatment see Walter Lippmann, US Foreign Policy: Shield o f the Republic. Boston: 
Little & Brown 1943; for the application of this principle to the post-World War II experience see Robert 
E. Osgood, “American Grand Strategy: Patterns, Problems, and Prescriptions, ” Naval War College Re­
view, September-October 1983, pp. 5-17.




























































































Limitations on available resources, especially the “budget squeeze” (the 
deficit in the US Federal Budget and the commitment of the Bush Admin­
istration to balance the budget without raising taxes), have contributed to 
increasing demands from both the Administration and Congress in the 
United States that its partners should carry “their fair share” of the 
“Transatlantic Bargain”.
What has the “Transatlantic Bargain” been all about? It has been, at its 
core
-  an Atlantic security guarantee, essential for the security and well-being 
of the United States itself, and for Western Europe as its strategic and 
political “glacis”;
-  a fundamental geopolitical calculation that the United States can not be 
indifferent to the balance of power in Europe;
-  an important device for containing the Soviet Union;
-  a means of access to markets and resources (and a correlate to the Mar­
shall Plan).
The United States commitment was in exchange for the promise of a sub­
stantial European contribution towards European defense.
With its “Troops-to-Europe Decision” (Sen. Res. 99) in 1951 Congress 
endorsed the “Transatlantic Bargain”, but already at this time it had qual­
ified its consent to President Truman’s decision to send an additional four 
division to Europe. It had stated that it was “the feeling of the Senate” 
that, among other things, the Joint Chiefs of Staff should certify that the 
European allies were making a realistic effort on behalf of European 
defense. The Senators felt that the European partners should make the 
major contribution to Allied general forces, and that provision should be 
made to utilize the military resources of Italy, West Germany, and Spain. 
They reserved for themselves the right to agree to any increase of these 
forces above the six divisions committed to Europe in 1950/51.51
The bargain was maintained intact into the late 1960’s, and again into 
the early 1980’s, but further circumscribed:
-  In a 1967 Trilateral Agreement the United States, Great Britain and the 
Federal Republic agreed to return some troops to their country of origin, 
but keep them assigned to NATO duty, with their equipment pre-posi- 
tioned (POMCUS), and have them transferred to Western Europe regu­
larly for exercises (REFORGER);
-  TTte 1982 Stevens amendment put a cap (of 315,000 men) on the num­
ber of US troops deployed in Europe. The following year the number 
was slightly raised, using a Presidential waiver, in order to deploy per­
sonnel for manning the new Pershing II and Cruise missile units.
-  The 1984 Nunn/Roth amendment and Cohen substitute served as a sig­
nal that the continued US military presence was contingent on increased
51 Senate Resolution 99, Conally/Russel Resolution with McCellan Amendment, 82nd US Congress, 
1st Session, April 4, 1951, p. S 3282; see also Wesley Byron Truitt, The Troops to Europe Decision: 





























































































European defense spending in the range of 3%, or as a substitute, the 
provision of an adequate munitions’ supply, increased numbers of aircraft 
shelters, and improved sustainability of conventional forces. Otherwise, 
in each of the next three years the US forces were mandated to be cut by 
30,000 men.
-  With the Nunn/Wamer amendment to the Defense Authorization Act 
(S. 1352) of 1989/90 the Senate tied the level of US troops to the then 
existing ration of allied troops, and mandated corresponding cuts if those 
were reduced.52
The call for a “fairer share of the burden” is as old as the alliance, but 
how does one measure a “fair share”? The public debate has focused on 
military spending, as it is easier to measure financial input that military 
output. For analytic purposes, and in terms of military relevance, 
“resources” and “output” are more relevant.
Any comparison of US and West European defense expenditures will 
be to the disadvantage of the West Europeans if one looks at the aggre­
gated input figures. However, in the US defense budget there is no dis­
tinction between expenditures for the NATO theatre, and those for other 
contingencies. Traditional wisdom has it that about 60% of all defense- 
related expenditures are for NATO-related purposes.
52 See Stanley R. Sloan, Defense Burden-sharing: US Relations with NATO Allies and Japan. June 24, 
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There are very obvious limits to the “numbers game”. If the output is 
measured one arrives at somewhat different figures: 54
Table 5: Country Performance in Selected Burdensharing and 
Force Improvement Areas 54
BE C A DE FR G E G R IT LU NL N O PO S P TU U K US JA
%  G D P  fo r  D e fe n se 0 © © 0 © • © © © © © © 0 0 • ©
A c tive  D u ty  M ilita ry  
a n d  C iv ilia n  a s  %  
o f P o p u la tion
0 © © 0 0 • 0 © © 0 0 © • © • ©
M ilita ry , C iv ilians , 
a n d  R e se rve s  a s  %  
o f P o p u la tion
0 © 0 0 0 • © © 0 • 0 0 0 © 0 e
G ro u n d  C o m b a t 
C a p a b ility  D E F /G D P 0 © 0 © 0 • © © 0 0 0 0 • © 0 9
A ir  F o rce  C o m b a t 
A irc ra ft/G D P 0 © 0 0 © • © © 0 0 • © • 0 0 ©
N a va l T o n n a g e /G D P © © © © © • © © © 0 • © • • 0 ©
N u c le a r C o n tib u tio n s 0 * © 0 0 0 0 * 0 © * * 0 0 • *
F orce  G o a l P e rfo rm ­
a n ce
© 0 © ♦ • © 0 © 0 0 © ★ © • • *
C D I F o rce  G o a ls © © © * • 0 0 © 0 0 0 * 0 • • *
M u n itio n s  S u s ta in a b i­
lity
© 0 © * 0 © 0 0 0 © © * © 0 • *
H o st N a tion  S upport 0 * 0 * • © 0 a 0 0 © * © 0 ♦ •
M ilita ry  A s s is ta n c e  
to  LD D I
© © © * • * © © 0 © * * * © • *
D e ve lo p m e n t 
A s s is ta n c e  a s  a  % o f 
G D P
0 0 • • 0 * 0 * • • * * * * © 0
O u t-o f-A re a  C o n tr ib u ­
tio n s  (P e rs ia n  G u lf 
S u p p o rt)
• © © • • © • 0 • 0 * © © • • 0
L e ve l o f P e rfo rm a n ce  a n d /o r C o n tr ib u tio n :
0  H ig h  0  M e d ium  © L ow  
0  H ig h /M e d iu m  0  M e d iu m /L o w  * N ot a v a ila b le  o r  no t a p p lica b le  
N o te : N o  se t o f  s e le c te d  in d ica to rs  ca n  fu lly  c o n ve y  th e  fu ll ra n g e  o f n a tio n 's  d e fe n se  
e ffo r ts  a n d  b u rd e n sh a rin g  co n tr ib u tio n s . R e a d e rs  are, th e re fo re , u rg e d  to  re v ie w  th is  
ch a rt in  co n ju n c tio n  w ith  th e  d e ta ined  d iscu ss io n s  and d a ta  e ls e w h e re  in th e  repo rt.
54 1989 Report on Allied Contributions to the Common Defense (Allied Commitments Report), Report 
by the Secretary of Defense to the US Congress, Washington, DC., April 1989, pp. 14, 15 and 9; see 




























































































With the Nunn/Roth amendment of 1984, the United States recognized 
that output categories are more important than unrelated input figures, 
and that there is an output equivalent to the spending goals. However, 
there are still other elements of the contribution which are even more 
difficult to measure and compare:
-  effectiveness, training, and readiness of troops;
-  lower costs of draft armies vs. voluntary forces;
-  investment in modem weapons systems vs. high operating costs;
Further limits to any “numbers game” are the non-material costs and 
services the Europeans are carrying, such as:
-  provision of ground and buildings for stationed and indigenous troops;
-  opportunity costs for military services;
-  heavy exposure to military manoeuvres, low-flying exercises etc.;
-  domestic opposition to military burden because of low threat percep­
tion, disagreement with national priorities, opposition to US leader­
ship;
-  singularly sharing the nuclear risk.
The Federal Republic also argues that its substantial support for Berlin is 
part of its contribution to the common defense.
Over time, the arguments for a “fairer share of the burden” have 
changed, and they will continue to do so in the future. A helpful experi­
ence has been the NATO Burden-sharing Exercise, which presented its 
report in December 1988.55 It has somewhat alleviated the problem but 
not put it to rest. If detente continues, very likely burden-sharing will no 
longer refer to who should be doing more, but who will be permitted to 
do less. Burden-sharing might become a competition in burden-shedding. 
This will be the case if the CFE talks yield a substantial arms control 
agreement.
A soft spot has been the American suggestion that NATO partners 
should cooperate more closely in responding to out-of-area contingencies. 
After some hesitation, in 1987 they cooperated with the United States in 
the security of the Gulf shipping lanes, either by sending naval units, 
otherwise supporting these activities by relieving members of other duties 
(Germany), or contributing financially (Luxembourg). Interestingly 
enough, these activities have been coordinated in the WEU Council of 
Ministers.
In the past, American demands for more burden-sharing have con­
tributed to European-American irritations and frustrations; but they have 
also challenged the Europeans to strengthen their defense cooperation and 
to develop concepts for a European Pillar, or security caucus, in order to 
make Western Europe less dependent on American politics.
An important function for a West European security caucus could be 
the development of solutions for multilateral burden-sharing with the 
United States. In the long-term, a European Pillar could contribute to a
^  See Enhancing Alliance Collective Security: Shared Roles, Risks and Responsibilities in the Al- 




























































































better sharing of risks, of burdens, and of responsibility with the United 
States. But this is not a very likely short-term perspective given the dif­
ferent power relationships, global and geopolitical roles of the United 
States and the West European countries.
IV. Prospects and Problems of West European Security Coop­
eration
As we have seen, the greatest need is to provide for European policy co­
ordination in those cases where the West Europeans are challenged to 
provide a common response. In the past, various institutions have been 
used for this purpose:
-  the EPC in 1973-76, to coordinate policies regarding both the CSCE 
process and the European-Arab dialogue;
-  the Western European Union during the Iran-Iraq Gulf War, to work 
out a European contribution in the Persian Gulf;
-  the EUROGROUP in some limited way, to deal the American demand 
for better burden-sharing;
-  The Independent European Program Group (alongside with the NATO 
CNADs) to coordinate and consult on joint armaments programs.
However, there exists little organization and therefore little continuity for 
agreeing on a common position, e.g. on burden-sharing vis-à-vis the 
United States. Available mechanisms are highly specialized, and often on 
an ad hoc basis deal with a specific project or contingency. Also, mem­
bership is quite selective, e.g. the French do not participate in EU­
ROGROUP activities, and the WEU leaves out most of the smaller Euro­
pean countries.
So there are many gaps and, at the same time, there is some overlap. In 
past years we have witnessed, however, a steady process toward closer 
European cooperation on issues of security. This process is encouraging, 
and nourishes the hope that one day a European security network or cau­
cus will emerge.
Some of the most promising developments have been:
-  the reactivation of the WEU, after the watering-down of the Gen- 
scher-Colombo initiative and the Single European Act;
-  the October 1986 Rome declaration on increased cooperation in secu­
rity policy, and the October 1987 decision on a European Security 
Platform;
-  and a general consensus that work on West European security coop­
eration neither should nor would endanger the cohesion of NATO nor 
the coupling of the United States to the defense of Western Europe.





























































































... as far as we can foresee there is no alternative to the Western strategy for the 
prevention of war... To be credible and effective the strategy of deterrence and defense 
must continue to be based on an adequate mix of appropriate nuclear and conventional 
forces, only the nuclear element of which can confront a potential aggressor with an 
unacceptable risk.
The substantial presence of US conventional and nuclear forces... embody the 
American commitment to the defense of Europe and provide the indispensable linkage 
with the US strategic deterrent...
We remain determined to pursue European integration including security and defense 
and make a more effective contribution to the common defense of the West. To this 
end we shall: ensure that our determination to defend any member country at its 
borders is made clearly manifest by means of appropriate arrangements, ... concert 
our policies on crises outside Europe insofar as they may affect our security inter­
ests.56 *
Emphasis is at present on the parallelism of the Atlantic Alliance in mili­
tary and security affairs, and the European Community in economic and 
political affairs. Given their different tasks, their membership and struc­
ture vary accordingly. Blurring the differences, e.g. charging the Com­
munity with security cooperation, would endanger the usefulness of either 
one. Conceptually, however, it is difficult to conceive of a European Po­
litical Union without some responsibility for the common defense of 
Western Europe.
There is much evidence for the argument that European security coop­
eration will receive its input and its dynamic from the process of Euro­
pean integration, and not from security considerations. If it does, how­
ever, it will have to use the provisions of Art. 30 of the Single European 
Act to extend its policy reach to security affairs proper, not just the polit­
ical and economic dimensions of it.
A major problem will be to enlist the support of those countries which 
still hesitate to subordinate their defense policies to a supranational au­
thority, like France and Britain, or who, because of their neutral status, 
like Ireland, or because of domestic opposition, like Denmark, Spain and 
Greece, have in the past been careful not to align themselves too closely 
with the NATO military alliance.
It is, however, conceivable that one day the WEU might be integrated 
into the EC framework, especially if NATO loses some some of its func­
tions and of its usefulness for the defense of Western Europe. Either the 
European Council could also meet as WEU Council, or the latter might be 
transformed into a select committee on security cooperation, with a spe­
cial member of the Commission charged with security affairs; the WEU 
Assembly meanwhile would transfer its functions to the European Par­
liament. On its road to political union the EC might well wish to further 
differentiate functions and membership. The result would be a variable





























































































structure by which some members join in specific tasks while others ab­
stain (“variable geometry”).
In the meantime, the nexus between the EC on the one hand, and the 
WEU and NATO on the other needs to be strengthened. In practice, the 
EC will have to show how it interprets Art. 30,6 of the Single European 
Act:
(a) The High Contracting Parties consider that closer cooperation on 
questions of European Security would contribute in an essential way to 
the development of a European identity in external policy matters. 
They are ready to coordinate their positions more closely on the politi­
cal and economic aspects of security.
(b) The High contracting Parties are determined to maintain the tech­
nological and industrial conditions necessary for their security. They 
shall work to that end both at a national level, and, where appropriate, 
within the framework of the competent institutions and bodies.
(c) Nothing in this Title shall impede closer cooperation in the field of 
security between certain High contracting Parties within the framework 
of the Western European Union or the Atlantic Alliance.57
Although the result of concern on part of some member states -  notably 
Ireland, Denmark and Greece58 -  that the Community was on the way 
toward a European defense organization, the Act does indeed give the 
Community the authority to coordinate various aspects of security. Its in­
dustrial policy will of necessity also have to deal with military R&D and 
production. The reference to the “technological and industrial conditions 
necessary for their security” gives the EC another handle to coordinate 
arms production, as well as to support the activities of the IEPG.
Given that the major challenges to the security of Western Europe are 
not caused by military threats, but rather are indicative of far-reaching 
changes in political, social and economic values, they will require eco­
nomic, social, ecological and other responses -  policies well within the 
realm of the Community. Emphasis on these aspects of security will in­
crease with a diminishing perception of an external military threat.
In the short-term, a preferred option to a merger of the two institutions 
and functions might be a reactivation of the “reserve potential” of the 
Western European Union, and its use as a “European Defense Caucus”, 
kept separate from the Community network.
An advantage of using the WEU would be that its membership is lim­
ited to those countries with a strong interest in common defense, and its 
institutional framework, though weak, is separate from both NATO and
57 “Single European Act of 1987,” The European Communities: Official Documents, Brussels: EC 
1988, p. 1049.
58 See Panos Tsakaloyannis, Ed., The Reactivation of the Western European Union: The Effects on the 




























































































the EC. If the necessary care is taken it is flexible enough to be compati­
ble with a still-existing NATO. Also, the WEU could operate alongside a 
European Community moving forward toward political union.
The speed and the direction of a reactivation of the Western European 
Union59 will depend on whether there is still the perception of a military 
threat from the Communist bloc, or whether the latter has more or less 
faded into oblivion, or been dissolved, with Soviet military power signifi­
cantly reduced. It will also need the positive spill-over of a dynamic pro­
cess of European integration, as it might also gain from an American dis­
engagement. In a changed security pattern, the WEU might be useful in a 
number of ways:
-  If the military threat continues, WEU could build on its security guar­
antee; it would need adequate forces of its own, especially if the West Eu­
ropeans could no longer rely on North American reinforcements, though 
they would have to take care not to violate any arms control agreements. 
The core of WEU forces could consist of the already existing German- 
French elements of defense cooperation. The remaining difficulties how­
ever should not be overlooked.
-  If the Communist threat has faded, and a balance of power been 
achieved, it would still be prudent (though difficult) to preserve the WEU 
as a system of reassurance, in case the detente process breaks down, or 
violence erupts in a decaying Communist bloc.
-  With the Cold War overcome, and NATO and the Pact dissolved, a new 
and very different role for a West European security system seems con­
ceivable: it could be transformed into an all-European system of collec­
tive security. Then, the Western European Union could either be used to 
securely anchor the Federal Republic to the West, alongside the ties of the 
European Community, or, in case of a German confederation, to control 
Germany and to circumscribe its political ambitions.
There will be no stable political situation in Europe if Germany acts as 
a halfway house, or as a freewheeling entity, between East and West. I 
therefore think that the recreation of a strong and active “Mitteleuropa” is 
not very likely, rather I foresee increasing tendencies to contain the 
center of Europe, and to anchor both parts securely in integrative frame­
works. Care should be taken, however, not to discriminate against Ger­
many, but to integrate it on the basis of equality and mutuality.
The CSCE process is reserved for the emerging East-West detente re­
lationship in Europe. If the CFE talks yield, as expected, substantial 
agreement for cutting conventional forces in Europe by half, this process 
will receive added momentum. From regulating relations among states 
with different political and social systems, and belonging to opposing
59 See Cahen, The Western European Union and NATO. op. tit.; Willem F. van Eekelen, Future Euro- 
pean Defense Co-operation: The Role o f WEU. An ESG Occasional Paper, September 1989; Reinhardt 
Rummel, “Modernizing Transatlantic Relations: West European Security Cooperation and the Reaction in 
the United States”, The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 12, No. 4 (Autumn 1989), pp. 83-92; Tsakaloyan- 




























































































military alliances, it might gradually transform the present European 
system into a more cooperative European order of peace.
The revolutionary developments in Eastern Europe in the winter of 
1989 have reminded us that any policy assumptions may change rather 
quickly. There are four possible scenarios to think about:
1. NATO could, over time, lose its function as a coherent and credible 
military alliance, either due to
-d eep  cuts in arms control, which would fundamentally change the 
overall security pattern in general, and the existing NATO alliance 
framework in particular;
-  a withdrawal of US (and British) troops from the European continent 
as a result of an East-West agreement, because of domestic pressure in 
America, or due to vocal opposition in Germany;
-  continued European (German?)-American frictions, in the first instance 
over economic issues (given increased economic competition after 1992), 
but spreading to political issues and leading to a high degree of mutual 
frustration;
-  or a dissolution of NATO, together with the Warsaw Pact, in the 
course of continued East-West detente.
2. The process of European integration could significantly change. Close 
policy coordination and political union could come to a halt, either be­
cause of British obstruction; as a consequence of a nationalist government 
in France; or as a result of political deadlock after the 1990 elections in 
Germany, or the formation of a shaky red-green coalition in Bonn.
It would be highly doubtful whether there could be an ersatz for a pro­
cess of European integration run aground. Cooperation among the WEU 
members has not yet been sufficiently developed to serve as a holding op­
eration. The same problems stalling European union would also prevent 
closer cooperation among the nine WEU countries. However, the process 
of European integration might be sufficiently advanced that, even in the 
case of serious political problems, it could not be completely reversed.
And what happens if the European Community is more successful than 
many expect today, and within a few years develops into a real Political 
Union? It would then acquire a security competence of its own. But how 
will it coordinate the emerging European defense consensus with a still 
existing Atlantic alliance? What kind of bargain has to be struck with 
North America? How will relations evolve with the Soviet Union and 
Eastern Europe? Or with Japan?
3. Another possible, and no longer completely unlikely, development 
would be a significant change in the European balance of power, with the 
disintegration of the the Warsaw Pact, or, even more likely, of the 





























































































A dissolution of the Pact would not change significantly the existing 
European security structures since its members are closely tied to the So­
viet Union by a net-work of bilateral treaties of cooperation. However, 
with the outposts of the CPSU in the East European capitals, the local 
communist parties, being forced to renounce their leadership role by in­
ternal opposition, Soviet party control will weaken and might lead to a 
reinterpretation, or even a renegotiation, of the existing treaties.
The transformation of the East European economic system would have 
a formidable impact on the European Community. Any enlargement of 
the EC involving more neutral countries (Austria has also applied for as­
sociation with the EC) or former COMECON members, would change 
the Community significantly. It will either water down its political cohe­
siveness or strengthen the trend to a variable geometry.
4. Elections in the German Democratic Republic would result in a solid 
majority for a German Federation or Union, once again placing the Ger­
man Question at the head of the international agenda. To a large measure, 
political reactions will depend on whether the existing institutions are ca­
pable of providing stability and structure in the face of radical political 
change.
Special responsibility will rest with the European Community, as one of 
the big attractions for the people in the GDR will be the prospect of par­
ticipating as quickly and as fully as possible in the economic prosperity of 
Western Europe. NATO will be faced with the task of developing Euro­
pean security arrangements that neither undermine the credibility of the 
alliance vis-à-vis the West nor are threatening to the Soviet Union and 
Eastern Europe. The Four Power mechanism still existing will also come 
into play though care should be taken that the post-war system of Four 
Power control over Germany is not resurrected.
The biggest responsibility will rest, however, with West Germany. It 
will be expected to act as a responsible midwife of German unification, as 
a stabilizer of a rapidly desintegrating East Germany, as well as a guaran­
tor of continued integration of Germany into the community of the West, 
the Federal Republic might, however, become fairly absorbed with this 
task, with little energy and resources to spend on strengthening European 
security cooperation.
In a time of change, the West will need cooperative structures to man­
age these changes. New challenges will have to be met:
1. How to implement and verify the East-West arms control regime which 
might result from successful CFE-negotiations?
The two alliances could be mandated to develop a mutual inspection 
system; a joint agency be established to to provide for verification of an 
all-European agreement on arms control and confidence measures. Also, 
the WEU, with its obvious capability to monitor arms and arms control, 




























































































2. How to formulate common European policies, not just vis-a-vis the 
United States, but also the other powers and states?
Probably there will be more than one forum to deal with this task: the 
European Council or EPC on general political and economic matters; 
EUROGROUP (with, hopefully, France back into the fold) for military 
cooperation; a revitalized WEU or a new European caucus within NATO 
for security policy in general. Pragmatic solutions will be more suitable 
than formal ones, and only experience will show which ones are adequate 
to meet the task.
3. How to provide stability for a process of rapid change in Eastern Eu­
rope, and how to control the dynamic of the unfolding German question?
A strong European Community cooperating closely in both economic 
and political affairs, would be best suited for this task. It would develop a 
new “Marshall Plan for Eastern Europe” to beef up the decaying 
economies and stabilize the crumbling political systems of the East Euro­
pean countries, while at the same time encouraging domestic liberalization 
and democratization. The GDR might either find its place in a reformed 
East European system, establish a net-work of treaty relations (Vertrags- 
gemeinschaft) with the Federal Republic, or achieve, in a controlled pro­
cess, union with the Federal Republic.
4. How to cope with Third World contingencies or threats?
Coordination of policies on Third World contingencies has in the past
been most difficult given the different historical traditions of the Euro­
pean states. While France and Great Britain still honor some of their 
previous colonial commitments, the Federal Republic has shied away 
from any “out-of-area” military commitment, and limited its involvement 
to economic support and a few activities in the United Nations frame­
work. Though the German position has recently undergone some changes, 
a long road has yet to be travelled before a common European position 
could emerge.
5. How to cope with the new dimensions of security: environment, the 
atmosphere, water, resources et al„ or those problems where the old and 
the new dimensions of security overlap, e.g. economic security or an in­
ternational environmental regime?
A whole new spectrum of issues is unfolding, which will change inter­
national relations as soon as nations realize that these challenges can only 
be met jointly, and not on a national basis. Given an increasing global in­
terdependence, a European framework for their solution might be too 
limited. This is a reminder that any European network has to be closely 




























































































It is very difficult to speculate on the direction European security coop­
eration will take in the future.60 The most likely development is a slow 
process toward increasing West European political cooperation, extending 
to security affairs with pragmatic, partly ad hoc, and somewhat messy 
(but in general adequate) structures being developed. With the diffusing 
of the East/West conflict the creation of new All-European structures will 
receive a strong push. At the same time, new challenges will arise in the 
Third World, and the non-military dimensions of security will gain in 
importance.
60 Jonathan Alford and Kenneth Hunt, Eds., Europe in the Western Alliance. Towards A European De- 
ftnse Entity? London: Macmillan Press 1988 (Studies in International Security: 26).
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